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Abstract
This paper critically engages with the concept of development through an analysis of epistemological 
justice in education for sustainable development (ESD) and presents alternative strategies for 
adaptation of the concept in the South. Many definitional challenges still surround development 
studies. The paper draws on the work of Wolfgang Sachs (1999) who asserts that the notion 
of sustainability has been consumed by development, presenting a view of sustainability which 
challenges the current and dominant economically driven hegemonic development discourse in 
which sustainability has become embedded. Further useful perspectives for this paper are offered by 
Amartya Sen (2001) who refers to development as a form of freedom. Sachs (1999) maintains 
that global definitions of development cement the dominant hegemonic discourse of the leading 
North, which has resulted in an obfuscation of the epistemological contribution from the South. 
The paper argues that, in the integration of congruent and enabling conceptual frameworks, 
allowing epistemic justice and validating the lived experience of learners through socially responsive 
pedagogical frameworks, South Africa is beginning to respond to the global environmental crisis. At 
the core of the paper is the question of whether an African ethical position advances the attainment 
of sustainability objectives. The paper concludes by positing a shift in scholastic and social 
understandings of development, and redefining the term from a changing terrain which may seem 
immutable with the current environmental crisis. 
Keywords: Epistemology, development, pedagogy, justice, African ethics. 
Introduction
At the core of problematising development lies the question of defining and critiquing the term. 
In extending the definition, this paper draws on Sachs (1999), a developmental theorist who 
critiques Western (Anglo-American and European) ideas of development and Sen  (2001), who 
writes from an economic position. Both scholars are drawn on in this paper for questioning 
epistemic justice. 
In incorporating an African ethic into sustainability discourse, the question of epistemic 
justice is most appropriate as a starting point in the debate of sustainability and epistemology. 
Locating this discussion in a decolonial theoretical framework (Grosfoguel, 2013), evoking an 
African ethic in sustainability, there is a need to first define an African ethical position. Prior 
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to critiquing development, or extending the definition as considered by the arguments of both 
scholars who will be discussed in this paper, the link between epistemic justice and sustainability 
needs to be clarified. Arguing for epistemic justice that is substantiated by an African ethical 
framework will underscore the link between the two. 
Clarifications on epistemic justice will serve the purpose of advancing the role of an African 
ethic in producing a critical citizenry which understands the moral obligation in meeting 
sustainability goals. Using a reflective understanding of the Eco-Schools programme (with my 
own experience of it), interactive models of teaching and learning are explored as the premise 
for the argument in this paper, which demands epistemic justice in defining development. 
The need to fully exhaust the debate of epistemic justice from an African ethical position 
will become clear, through making the link between sustainability and epistemology as a 
point of discussion. To substantiate Sachs’s position, who argues ‘that development is the 
never ending race’ (1999:29), understanding ‘modernity as synonymous with colonialism’ 
(Grosfoguel, 2007:218) is of fundamental importance. An African ethical position and its use 
in the sustainability discourse should thus be understood in two parts: 1) as a shift from the 
universal conceptions of development; and 2) as creating an ecology of knowledges which is a 
‘constitutive part of the pluriversity’ (Grosfoguel, 2012:2). 
This paper posits that epistemic justice arises as a response to the call from the decolonial 
theoretical position (Grosfoguel, 2013) for alternative conceptions of development and 
modernity, one which necessitates a conceptual shift in understanding education for sustainable 
development (ESD) through the use of an African ethic. In texturing the conceptual critique 
in this paper, Sen’s (2001) capabilities approach (with specification to capabilities deprivation, 
conceptualised in this argument as epistemic injustice) will be considered for the purpose of 
extending the definition of development. Capabilities deprivation, understood as the privileging 
of Western conceptions of modernity, leads to epistemic injustice, highlighting the dialectical 
relationship between epistemic injustice and capabilities deprivation. The dialectic here being 
the privileging of Western definitions of development as the thesis, resultant capabilities 
deprivation as the antithesis, and epistemic injustice as the synthesis – thereby revealing the 
interactive relationship between epistemic injustice and capabilities deprivation. This paper 
raises key problematics in Western ideas of equating development with progress, and highlights 
the tensions between progress and sustainability. The paper seeks to resolve this tension by 
broadening the definition of development, using the capabilities approach as proffered by 
Amartya Sen. This is in line with the ‘architectonic capability’ argument advanced in the work 
of Le Grange (2012a:139). Le Grange argues that ubuntu/ukama (informed by an African ethic) 
‘can be seen as an architectonic capability, as it gives rise to the realisation of other capabilities’ 
(2012a:143). Ukama, as explored by Le Grange, denotes an African moral principle derived 
from the Shona language and means ‘interconnectedness with the universe’ (2012b:62). From 
this definition, developed through an analysis of language (Shona, isiXhosa and isiZulu), the 
parameters of an African ethic become more apparent, making the task of setting up an African 
ethical position attainable.
At the core, this paper seeks to posit how epistemic justice, defined from an African ethical 
position, upholds and advances the attainment of sustainability objectives. 
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Defining an African Ethical Position 
Ramose defines ethical responsibility as acting to ‘promote life and avoid killing’ (2014:68) 
while further substantiating that this ethical position should meet the criteria of acknowledging 
the living and the living-dead, while leaving the land as good as we found it (2014:75). This, he 
argues, meets the African understanding of community, which necessitates ‘an overall obligation 
towards the living – which can otherwise be articulated as human beings, plant and animal 
kingdoms – the living-dead, or ancestors, who continue to live with us and leaving the land 
as good as we found it’ (2014:75). A moral obligation to the community implies that which 
allows one to truly ‘realise personhood in caring not only for themselves but also for the others’ 
(Le Grange, 2012c:333). The assertion of a moral obligation towards others, which should not 
be ‘limited to human life, but extended to the natural environment’ (Le Grange, 2012a:143), 
re-inscribes the African ethical definition of community as outlined by Ramose (2014). It is 
clear how the ‘architectonic capability’ (Le Grange, 2012a:139) can be understood as epistemic 
justice, through recognising an African ethical position and incorporating this ethic within 
the sustainability discourse as it has framed the historical responses of African communities of 
southern Africa to their natural environments. The ‘architectonic capability’, as coined in the 
work of Le Grange (2012a:139), begins the discussion which seeks to broaden the definition of 
development. 
The conception of the ethical position presented in this paper shifts away from a 
communalism conception of personhood, which looks at the ‘relationship between the 
individual and the community while linking this relationship to morality, moral thought and 
reasoning’ (Ikuenobe, 2006:51). The caution against conceptualising this ethical position as 
a form of communalism or humanism is aptly articulated by Le Grange, who quotes from 
Ramose, ‘humanness [...] is thus opposed to any “–ism”, including humanism, for this tends 
to suggest a condition of finality, a closedness or a kind of absolute either incapable of, or 
resistant to, any further movement’ (2012b:63). This limitation is once more raised by Ramose, 
in response to Metz, as Ramose rejects an attempt to mould African morality and ethics into a 
Western conception. He states:
Wiredu, and Bujo, including many other African philosophers do not speak to Metz’s 
conception of ‘normative theory’ as ‘articulation and justification of a comprehensive, 
basic norm that is intended to account for what all morally right actions have in common 
as distinct from wrong actions’. On the contrary they speak to a multiplicity of ethical 
principles that found and permeate African morality without any implicit or explicit 
claim to immutability, essentiality or eternity. (Ramose, 2007:351)
A distinction should therefore be made between ‘ethical’ and ‘moral’ African positions which 
would seek to clarify the differences between Ramose (2014) and Ikuenobe (2006). Articulating 
an ethical responsibility or obligation, Ramose seeks to propose a sense of reasoning which 
defines our actions in what he terms ‘right reason’ (Ramose, 2014:75) underscored by justice; 
while Ikuenobe could be understood to be articulating moral obligation from an internal 
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truth perspective, which demands the ethical as the juridical adjudicator in the clash between 
conflicting internal truth positions. In this adjudication, the ethical becomes the forebear of 
justice, as both positions of conflicting internal truths will be judged against reason, premised on 
what is ethically just. Right reason, in the juridical system used in mediating between conflicting 
internal truth positions, is to be understood in this argument as that which is justly fair. 
Ikuenobe’s conception of personhood, which is linked to a ‘communalism definition of 
the self ’ (2006:52), extends Ramose’s argument (though differing in its presupposition of 
communalism) ‘through a recognition of the collective community as a constitutive part of the 
self ’ (2006:75), stressing the first two elements of social responsibility and ethical obligation 
noted as regarding: ‘the living’ and ‘the living-dead’ (Ramose, 2014:75). The third prescriptive 
element of the ethical position, defined by Ramose as ‘leaving the land as we found it’ 
(2014:75), can be understood as social responsibility that is a ‘constitutive part of personhood’ 
(Ikuenobe, 2006:52). This element supports Le Grange’s claim, which highlights the three 
ecologies otherwise known as ‘self, social and nature’ (2012b:57). 
Moving away for a moment from the philosophical framework used in developing this 
argument, the constituent parts of personhood can otherwise be taken to mean homoeostasis. 
Homoeostasis in the ecological sciences is understood to be that which is whole, with 
individual parts serving the purpose of ‘self-regulating feedback mechanisms which maintain 
the whole’ (Sachs, 1992:31). Once more, the concept of homoeostasis substantiates the 
argument of Le Grange (2012b:59), who notes that the effect, be it negative or positive in 
one category, will inherently influence the other categories within the three ecologies. The 
argument of homeostasis therefore can be understood as underscoring the ethical obligations 
set out in Ramose’s argument, which demands that we ‘leave the land as we found it’ (2014:75) 
as this serves the purpose of supporting life for future generations – an argument rooted in an 
African ethical position. 
Defining this as an African ethic demonstrates how this moral and ethical position moves 
away from individualistic reasoning claimed by the autonomous agent affirmed by Descartes's 
cogito claim, ‘I think therefore, I am’ (Grosfoguel, 2007:214). Later, this paper will consider the 
power of this claim that has been used in dismissing African ontologies, leading to epistemic 
injustice, otherwise termed ‘epistemicide’ (Grosfoguel, 2013:73). Using an African ethic 
demonstrates the intrinsic relation between the individual and the ecological, highlighting the 
ethical and moral obligations for a collective existence which speaks to realising sustainability 
objectives. If the conceptual framing of interactive teaching models recognises the individual as 
constituted by collective community and ecological components, social responsibility becomes 
imbued in pedagogical practices. Pedagogies of social responsibility substantiate Ramose’s 
requirement to leave the land as we found it (2014). 
An African Ethic and Epistemic Justice
Understanding local knowledge and indigenous knowledge systems (IKS) within the 
framework of an African ethic is critical to the argument being advanced in this paper. Writing 
from a position advocating for the integration of IKS into university curricula, Magara notes 
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the ‘particularity and specificity of indigenous knowledge to a geographical locale’ (2015:25). To 
fully realise the objectives of this paper as set out in the introduction, Magara’s definition needs 
extension, with clear limitations which caution against an essentialist understanding of IKS and 
which are underpinned by an African ethic. 
Local knowledge can be understood as that which is particular, site-specific and determined 
by the locale. IKS, conversely, specifically regarding the southern African sustainability 
discourse, should be evaluated against the ethical position that denotes a moral obligation to 
leave the land as we found it, in order to meet the criteria of being defined as an IKS. The 
move of locating IKS in an African ethic suggests a limitation on any knowledge system from 
being seen as indigenous to Africa. The inclination towards the African ethical proposition 
discussed above connotes a personhood rooted in social responsibility as a constitutive part of 
that personhood, therefore allowing for southern African knowledge systems to be viewed as 
indigenous on the premise of espousing a moral obligation. Indigeneity in knowledge systems 
must be understood to include variations in local knowledge, substantiating Ramose’s claim 
of ‘different internal truth positions’ (2014:70). Further, the differing internal truth positions 
make room for the continuously growing, changing and becoming, which is embedded in 
ubuntu as a humanness. 
Navigating the difference in ‘internal and external truth, which constitutes reality for a 
given individual’ (Ramose, 2014:68), the question of epistemic justice arises in the oppressive 
ontological denial masquerading as universal truth, as articulated in Western positions. 
Grosfoguel problematises the hegemonic power of ‘Western countries being the leading voices 
in constructing the realities of the rest of world’ (2013:87). 
The Truman doctrine of underdevelopment, initiated in 1949, subsequently led to the ‘never 
ending race of development’ (Sachs, 1999:30) and underscores the notion of epistemicide as argued 
by Grosfoguel (2013). Understanding epistemicide in African ethics requires a consideration of 
inherent power relations in the knowledge-production process. Almeida looks at the epistemology 
discussion from a race-based perspective and critiques the exclusion of Oriental/indigenous 
knowledge on the premise of its ‘experiential as opposed to empirical underpinnings’ (2015:82). 
This exclusion can otherwise be seen as an existence which serves to validate Western civilization 
(2015:82). Through privileging Western epistemes by defining progress as ‘developmental goals, 
judged on economic growth rates, Gross National/Domestic Product (GNP/GDP) rates’ 
(Sachs, 1999:32), ecological concerns are obfuscated if not entirely erased from the sustainability 
discourse, along with any contributions from indigenous knowledges which may respond to the 
ecological crisis using alternative epistemic frameworks. 
In playing what Sachs terms ‘the catch up game’ (Sachs, 1999:30), the developing world 
assumes the role Almeida talks about (2015), which is that of validating Western civilizations. 
Grosfoguel (2007) aptly demonstrates how the language of deficits continues to trap the 
indigenous subject in a constant colonial paradigm which began in the 16th century ‘with the 
colonial subject as having no language’, continued in the 18th and 19th century as having ‘no 
history’, and in the 21st century, ‘no democracy’ (2007:214). 
Epistemic justice clearly illustrates the need for an African ethic in suggesting ecological 
solutions, taking into consideration the ontological position of the African subject. To 
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illustrate this effectively, Martin, who speaks from a decolonial theoretical position, makes 
the claim that ‘African social organisation models, ethics and politics were never in English, 
Portuguese, Spanish or French’ (1992:49). Martin’s argument is nuanced by Mkandawire’s 
assertion illustrating gatekeeping, ‘which privileges Western researchers, even on matters of 
local policy development on the continent’ (1997:28). Appealing once more to epistemic 
justice, while working towards formulations which seek to advance the sustainability agenda, 
the incorporation of African ethics in response to the current ecological crisis could be 
termed appropriate and necessary. 
Using interactive teaching models demonstrated in the work of the Eco-Schools project, 
– which looks at acknowledging the specificity of location while responding meaningfully 
to the ecological challenges of that specific locale – epistemic justice becomes imbued in 
teaching and learning practices. Through inculcating social responsibility fostered by interactive 
teaching models, rooted in an understanding of personhood as a constitutive part of the 
broader community as advanced in an African ethic as the starting point, there is a clear link 
between epistemic justice and sustainability. Sustainability is therefore derived from social 
responsibility inherent in an African ethic and which, when recognised, begins to deliver on 
epistemic justice. Justifying the sustainability discourse in this way creates room for recognising 
different social organisation models that are not premised on development as defined from an 
economic understanding that continues the language of deficits, if a society does not meet the 
development standards as defined by the Western world. However, one would need to qualify 
why a response to the ecological crisis would use this approach to sustainability as opposed to 
the propositions which have been proffered by Western modernity. 
Having explained the limitations of Western modernity (as a trapping which continues to 
highlight deficits in the Oriental/indigenous subject, and manifesting as a neo-colonial ordering 
of the contemporary world, what Le Grange terms ‘Integrated World Capitalism’ [2012b:57]), 
further articulations prove the need to redefine our conceptions of sustainability and 
development. Esteva, a developmental theorist, points out how ‘contemporary understandings 
of development elucidate the deficit discourse and continue to subjugate the indigenous body’ 
(1992:8). Further to this, Western conceptions of the sustainability discourse alienate and 
remove the socio-cultural specificities in sustainability, reinforcing the need to make economic 
development sustainable, which should be understood as a fundamental contradiction in the 
pursuit of a more sustainable future. This approach to sustainability has its origins in the first 
attempt at an internationally cohesive effort towards mitigating environmental degradation 
– notably, the Brundtland Report, otherwise known as our Common Future (1987). In the 
process of mitigation, sustainable development has come to mean a form of ‘managerialism 
of the environment’ (Sachs, 1999:33), with cybernetics used in the homoeostasis conceptions 
of the world as a means of exercising dominion over the environment through cybernetic 
manipulation or regulation. 
In approaching the development debate from a position which divorces human interaction 
from ecology, but which rather assumes a management strategy for dealing with key challenges 
facing the imminent threat of global climate change, Grosfoguel’s ‘sub-zero position of the 
God-Knower’ (2007:213) begins to reveal the implications of colonialism. This position 
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explicates two fundamental tenets of this argument. Firstly, the sub-zero Eurocentric perspective 
is the focal point for creating universalisms which silence indigenous ways of knowing by 
proffering solutions couched in universality when, in fact, they themselves are provincial ways 
of knowing. Secondly, this position assumes the God-Knower perspective, which alienates 
humanity from the environment, and removes the African ethic in understanding personhood 
as a constitutive part of the third element of Ramose’s definition, which is that of ‘leaving 
the land as we found it’ (2014:75). In removing the third element of the ethical definition, 
cybernetic manipulation, masquerading as homoeostasis management, undermines a genuine 
commitment to sustainability and thus allows the developmental agenda to continue unchecked 
and dressed-up in a new coat.
The first tension presented by the sub-zero position presents another challenge, which is that 
of the power relations inherent in the knowledge-production process. In acknowledging the 
provinciality of an African ethic, the sub-zero position dismisses any contributions which could 
be proffered as peripheral. The act of peripherising continental/provincial positions highlights 
the endemic epistemological injustice of the contemporary world order, while taking us back 
to the claim that ‘African social organisation models, political organisation and economic 
principles were never articulated in English, French, Portuguese or Spanish’ (Martin, 1992:49). 
In the act of defiance through challenging the Western definitions of development, there is 
the continual gating of the indigenous subject, what Esteva (1992:8) calls the ‘pathologising, 
anomaly and unnatural behaviour’ (as termed by the West) in not following unilinear 
conceptions of development. 
Through the pathological ascriptions given to states which do not follow the Western 
modes of development, wa Thiong’o (1993:51) calls our attention to the use of ‘economic and 
political control invariably leading to cultural domination’. Cultural domination understood 
as epistemic injustice cannot, thus, be escaped with the constant totalitarian hegemonic 
ideas of development which still permeate globally. Calling for a shift in such a conceptual 
understanding of sustainable development is premised on the need for epistemic justice as a 
means to effectively deal with the ecological crisis facing us today. However, the economic and 
political control articulated by wa Thiong’o (1993) cannot be divorced from the concerns raised 
by Mkandawire (1997:28) earlier in the paper, which speak to the gatekeeping stance taken 
by policy developers and the African state in privileging the voice of Western researchers and 
academics, even in matters of local policy development.
Sustainability obfuscated by development presents the discourse on ecology with a multitude 
of challenges which need attention. Fundamentally, development can be understood as a 
tension between sustainability and the course towards economic growth and expansion. Forever 
attempting to escape the connotations of being termed underdeveloped, lacking and deficient 
(Esteva, 1992:7), third world economies constantly strive for the economic growth rates of 
Western countries while neglecting the reality of the unsustainable nature of rapid growth and 
economisation. Other than the unsustainability of economisation, there is a further neglect, one 
which links this process of ‘development with colonisation’ (Esteva, 1992:17). 
To resolve the tension between development and sustainability, the work of Amartya Sen 
can be of use to this argument. Looking at development through the lens of capabilities, 
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which can be defined as ‘political freedom, social opportunities and protective security’ (Sen, 
2001:10), allows for the flourishing of individuals in any given society, and thus substantiates 
the term ‘development’. Political freedom may be defined as the opportunity to participate in 
constructing social policy and defending individual rights, which can only be fully actualised in 
a social context that recognises the individual as a constituent part of society. Enabling factors 
such as social opportunities (access to education, health-care) and political freedom, allow the 
individual to live their desired life. Protective security speaks to a social environment which 
does not bring harm to the individual in their pursuit of these enabling factors. Fundamental 
in the realisation of these capabilities, however, is the notion of the architectonic capability, 
understood as ubuntu (Le Grange, 2012a:139), framed and informed by an African ethic.
It is imperative to understand the interactive relation amongst the capabilities stated earlier. 
Deprivation of these capabilities is a denial of access to the three elements, and priority should 
be given to the social opportunities (attainment of an education, access to medical facilities 
and freedom of trade) which allow for the full actualisation of political freedom and protective 
security. Social opportunities, with the advancement of society through education, introduce 
the concept of development without tensions in relation to sustainability. 
Sen’s (2001) conception of development is not underpinned by rigid economic assessments 
of GNP/GDP and economic growth rates, and can thus can be viewed as an enabling model in 
understanding development. It is enabling in that it allows for the provincial definitions of societal 
advancement to be actualised using contextual interpretations of what development may look 
like. From this position, sustainability linked to social advancement in the attainment of these 
capabilities speaks to epistemic justice, in the contextual definitions proffered in consideration of 
solutions, which may be used to advance the sustainability agenda within a given locale. 
The tension between development and sustainability can be resolved by proffering solutions 
which are based on an understanding of what is most pressing within each context in relation 
to the current ecological crisis. Using different epistemic positions not only allows for epistemic 
justice, but, through a site-specific ecological education that also responds to international 
demands, also allows for a more sustainable use of the human commons. 
Interactive Models
Interactive teaching and learning models, briefly introduced in this argument, are 
fundamental to a model of ecological education that is site-specific while teaching from a 
position seeking to respond to the international challenge for more sustainable uses of the 
global commons. The Eco-Schools project, through its environmental education programme, 
not only integrates environmental education across the school curriculum, but further calls 
for practical learning. Taking the discussion on the ecological crisis outside of the classrooms 
and investigating local challenges (such as river acidification, sustainable water consumption, 
and the recycling of greywater within the school – Maritzburg College), all point to the use 
of contextual knowledge in responding to the ecological crisis.
Interactive teaching models which look at the everyday impact of our consumption 
patterns and their effects on the environment, bring the discussion of the African ethical 
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position back into the debate. Personhood, constituted by the third element (Ramose, 
2014:75), is exemplified in the interactive teaching models advanced above. 
Social opportunities can also be recognised as the underpinning component of this form 
of teaching and learning. Without these social opportunities in education (advocated in this 
paper as interactive teaching methodologies, otherwise known as capabilities deprivation), 
development cannot be actualised. This use of the term ‘development’ can be clarified as: 
development defined outside the scope of rigid economic measurement instruments such as 
GDP/GNP and economic growth rates, but rather looking to the Human Development Index 
(HDI). A concession should be made in this argument to recognise that the use of the HDI itself 
may have shortcomings, in that it is defined from a Western perspective; however, as used in the 
work of Sen (2001), there is more room to navigate the definitions of development. 
Invoking the African ethic obliges the debate on development to start with the 
recognition of how African social organisation, political theory and legal frameworks are 
written from the African position. Criticality is therefore necessary in formulating African 
articulations of development which are neither romanticised nor distorted in an arrested 
conception of what the African position may be. Mbembe, writing from a post-colonial 
theoretical perspective, notes the need for a differentiation between the ‘traditional and 
fictive conceptions of the African subject’ (2002:257). It is at this juncture that criticality 
must be deployed when formulating African ideas, so as to move away from essentialist 
arguments and understanding of what an African ethic in sustainability may be. While 
noting this caution as given by Mbembe (2002), it is also fundamentally important to 
note how Western modernity has appropriated elements of African thought, qualifying the 
argument made by Ramose which necessitates ‘a critical explication of Western modernity 
acknowledging the contributions of African thought in advancing certain areas of Western 
civilisation’ (2014:72).
Conclusion
Understanding the African ethical position which speaks to social responsibility and an ethical 
obligation as defined by ‘a) the recognition of the living, b) the living-dead and c) leaving the land 
as we found it’ (Ramose, 2014:75), has been the premise of this argument. From this position, 
epistemic justice has been argued for in the advancement of the sustainability agenda, taking into 
consideration the different epistemic positions which are dismissed by the Western hegemonic 
conceptions of development while arresting the attainment of sustainability objectives. 
The tension between sustainability and development has been examined through showcasing 
how development envelopes sustainability, and is used to manage the continued objectives of 
development, economisation and subsequently colonisation in a new form. Economisation and 
colonisation have been argued against from a position of epistemic injustice that negates the 
ontological existence of the African/Oriental subject and uses the development discourse to 
validate Western civilisations (Almeida, 2015). 
Explicating the problematics of development in the sustainability discourse has 
been used to showcase how continued epistemic injustice masquerading as Western 
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universalisms perpetuates a degradation of the natural environment. Western countries have 
responded to the ecological crisis with a managerial strategy that assumes ‘the sub-zero, 
God-Knower position’ (Grosfoguel, 2007:214) and cloaks the manipulation of cybernetics 
for the purpose of managing homoeostasis. Clear distinctions have been made between this 
approach to the current ecological crisis and the African ethical response. 
Attempting to resolve the tensions between sustainability and development, this paper 
has put forward a more inclusive definition of development, one which looks at the 
capabilities approach as argued by Sen (2001). Capabilities rooted in interactive teaching 
methodologies, illustrated by a short exploration of the Eco-Schools programme, locates 
the argument in the African ethical position of ‘leaving the land as we found it’ (Ramose, 
2014:75). 
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